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A well-developed literature describes how to use redundancy to build storage and communications systems that are resistant to failure. Most of this work stems from 
Moore and Shannon’s seminal 1956 article about the 
construction of reliable electric circuits from less re-
liable relays.1 Instead of failing, systems with redun-
dancy can enter a degraded mode of operation until 
the failed component can be replaced. Although such 
approaches have made modern computers incredibly 
reliable, attempts to apply these techniques to secu-
rity have largely failed. Despite the widespread adop-
tion of the so-called defense-in-depth strategy, the best 
metaphor for security remains that of a chain—only as 
strong as its weakest link. 
But why should security engineering fundamen-
tally di!er from reliability engineering? We believe 
it’s because modern systems aren’t designed to support 
some form of ongoing operation after their security is 
compromised. Degraded operation of a RAID system 
decreases performance, but it doesn’t corrupt the com-
puter’s "le system. In contrast, security degradation 
from a successful hacker penetration typically results 
in changes so pervasive that the most cost- e!ective 
recovery strategy is to declare the system a total loss, 
wipe the hard drive, and reinstall the system’s soft-
ware and data. Some people amusingly call this ap-
proach “nuke from orbit and reinstall,” a reference to 
the 1979 "lm Alien.
We argue that a critical part of living with inse-
curity is the ability to continue using systems in a 
controlled and meaningful manner, even after they’ve 
been compromised. We use the 
term degraded security to describe 
this state. Instead of advocating re-
dundancy and defense in depth, we 
apply James Sterbenz’s ResiliNets (resilient networks) 
model to describe the tasks of managing a system that 
might be attacked.2 Prior related work has applied 
ResiliNets to denial-of- service (DoS) attacks but not 
to other security threats (see the “Related Work in 
Network Resilience and Intrusion Tolerance” side-
bar); here, we show that this framework can be used 
for understanding a range of operations in a security-
degraded state.
ResiliNets
Designing for operations in a security-degraded en-
vironment makes it easier for users and managers to 
live with the inherent insecurity that permeates all 
computer systems. Systems can be designed to func-
tion after an attack—for example, the system might 
use various forms of redundancy to protect data, or 
it could store multiple copies of critical data or soft-
ware in fast read-write storage, in slower write-once 
or write-protected storage, or even on remote systems 
in a di!erent security domain. If an attack modi"es 
one version, another version might still be available. 
ResiliNets envisions a four-part cycle—defend 
(treat networks with processes designed to increase 
the probability of an attack’s failure), detect (identify 
service degradation or attack), remediate (halt the 
immediate damage), and recover (restore the system 








Operations with Degraded Security
Modern systems aren’t designed to support some 
ongoing operations after their security is compromised. 
Using the ResiliNets model, the authors discuss 
!ve strategies for operating in a degraded security 
environment.
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ground processes—diagnose (system operators per-
form root-cause analysis of observed faults) and re"ne 
(evaluation of the previous "ve steps)—mediate and 
constantly improve this cycle.2
As noted earlier, we de"ne degraded security as a 
system or network state after a successful attack but 
before e!orts to recover from the attack have been 
completed. We use this de"nition in the ResiliNets 
framework but with an important caveat: whereas 
much of the previous work in resilience has focused on 
DoS attacks and appropriate responses, we argue that 
the primary result of such attacks is to degrade per-
formability3 or, in security terminology, availability. 
Here we focus on other security properties.
Some will argue that all computer systems and net-
works are continually in a state of degraded security, 
Related Work in Network Resilience and Intrusion Tolerance
L iterally, an object is resilient if it returns to its previous shape after being deformed. Applied to computer networks, this 
term typically describes systems that can continue providing ser-
vice after experiencing challenges such as erroneous equipment 
recon!guration, denial-of-service attacks, and node loss. 
Unlike traditional challenges to reliability, security attacks 
can be the result of malicious intent. Although it makes sense to 
model a system’s reliability by assuming the chance of failure and 
detection for each event is independent, this isn’t the case when 
a system is under attack by an intelligent adversary. When model-
ing reliability, it’s reasonable to assume that any component 
can fail. When modeling security, it’s reasonable to assume that 
attackers will target the components whose failure will cause the 
most damage. When modeling reliability, failures aren’t likely to 
be correlated in a manner that will ensure maximum damage or 
disruption. In the realm of security, attackers frequently correlate 
their attacks speci!cally for such purposes. 
Michael Fry, Mathias Fischer, and Paul Smith note that chal-
lenge identi!cation is a critical aspect of network resilience in 
the security domain.1 For example, both a distributed denial-of-
service (DDoS) attack and a "ash crowd are detected in the same 
manner, but the two require different remediation and recovery 
strategies. (A DDoS attack is best remediated through aggres-
sive !ltering, whereas "ash crowds are better solved through TCP 
rate limiting.) Thus, attackers have an added incentive to disrupt 
identi!cation processes to prolong an attack’s effect.
Although resiliency and security have been areas of research in 
mesh and sensor networking for more than a decade, little of this 
work focuses on operations after security has been compromised. 
We can !nd only two exceptions: Hao Yang and colleagues’ 2005 
work, a proposed architecture in which secret keys are bound 
to geographic locations,2 and Arvind Seshadri, Mark Luk, and 
Adrian Perrig’s SAKE protocol, which allows compromised nodes 
to reestablish their secrecy and authenticity keys, even if the at-
tacker can read and modify the memory of both nodes before the 
protocol executes.3 
Others have explored some aspect of operations in a security-
degraded environment. Alysson Neves Bessani and colleagues 
explored a series of architectures for fault and intrusion tolerance 
and removal, including Crutial (Critical Utility Infrastructural 
Resilience),4 which provides for recovery of compromised systems 
through the use of a subsystem that allows a protected and 
trusted part of each node to communicate with other nodes in a 
timely and reliable manner. 
US Department of Defense systems generally must have 
documented plans and procedures to recover from security 
compromises. These are described in DoD Instruction 8500.2 
as part of the “availability” requirements.5 Deployed systems 
should have documents that clearly describe the essential 
functions and prioritized plans for restoration in the event of a 
security compromise. Despite these requirements, we haven’t 
seen plans that seriously contemplate continued operations of 
systems with known security compromises. One reason could 
be that the failure to meet these requirements is rarely evident 
without extensive analysis. A second reason might be the lack 
of available and understood technical approaches for meeting 
these requirements. Cost is yet another factor; meeting these 
requirements increases costs but provides no apparent bene!t 
to system users.
Finally, the US National Institute of Standards and Technology 
has provided guidance6 on developing contingency and recovery 
plans for US federal government systems in the face of various 
kinds of failures and attacks. Unfortunately, the details of plans that 
discuss security measures generally aren’t available to the public.
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a claim that isn’t useful or probably even entirely true. 
Although a computer system on a disconnected net-
work that has just been loaded with a widely available 
operating system might have security vulnerabilities, 
it isn’t in a state of degraded security. 
People make decisions based on previous experi-
ence and prior knowledge, thus personal experience 
with malware and prior knowledge of major websites 
besieged by DoS attacks deeply a!ect many profes-
sionals’ approach to cybersecurity. One result, we hy-
pothesize, is that many professionals don’t understand 
the di#culty of detection or recognize a need for re-
mediation that is distinct from recovery. But when us-
ing Sterbenz’s framework, three discrete operations in 
a security-degraded environment emerge: detection, 
remediation, and recovery. Although many references 
combine remediation and recovery in a single step, 
they should be distinguished. Remediation describes 
the way in which normal operations are intention-
ally altered while security is degraded; recovery en-
compasses the speci"c actions and mechanisms that 
are employed to restore the system to its preattack or 
corrected state.
Detection doesn’t seem like a di#cult problem if 
the prototypical model for a security incident is a dis-
tributed DoS (DDoS) attack or website defacement. 
Increasingly, however, malware is equipped with 
technical measures that let it evade detection. Such 
malware is sometimes called the advanced persistent 
threat, and we clearly need much better strategies for 
detecting it. Once certain types of malware have in-
fected an operating system, the only way to "nd them 
is to boot a trusted operating system from a separate 
medium and search for the malware using an inde-
pendent scanner. In practice, this is done by booting 
a desktop or server from a CD-ROM that proceeds 
to scan the system’s hard drive. But whereas several 
antivirus vendors support o$ine scanning, it’s rare to 
"nd organizations that proactively remove their sys-
tems from service to scan for malware. 
Instead, most organizations handle malware infes-
tations reactively: when they discover malware, they 
consider it a “best practice” to skip remediation entire-
ly and proceed to recovery; they often can’t, or won’t, 
take the time for diagnostics because they want their 
machines back online as soon as possible. Such proto-
cols are a poor match for sophisticated threats. Clean-
ing a system destroys critical information that might 
let an experienced security professional determine if 
the attack is the result of garden-variety malware or 
a sophisticated attempt to ex"ltrate information or 
control internal systems. Such procedures might even 
assist the attacker—for example, the “golden master” 
CD could be the source of the very malware or vul-
nerability that the attacker is exploiting.
For these reasons, distinguishing remediation from 
recovery is critical. In many cases, it’s simply infeasible 
to immediately recover a system—instead, it must oper-
ate for a period of time in its compromised state while 
other remediation procedures are put in place to mini-
mize the compromised system’s impact on the organiza-
tion as a whole. Continued operation of a compromised 
system also makes it possible to gather additional infor-
mation to determine the extent of the attack, just as a 
police o#cer might observe a burglar to determine if he 
or she has accomplices. Such an approach might be vital 
to supporting the diagnose and re"ne steps.
Remediation Strategies  
for Security-Degraded Operations
Di!erent organizations follow di!erent approaches 
when they su!er security compromises. Our experi-
ence is that there’s often a signi"cant di!erence be-
tween what organizations think they’re doing, what 
written policies say they should do, and what they 
actually do. Using the ResiliNets framework, we 
analyze here "ve di!erent approaches that we’ve en-
countered in recent years. Each represents an approach 
for living with insecurity. Unfortunately, none of the 
approaches provides the security guarantees that orga-
nizations require due to fundamental shortcomings in 
today’s computing systems. 
Strategy 1: Ignorance Is Bliss
Security is at most a secondary concern for most 
computer users. Ignoring compromises and sim-
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Figure 1. ResiliNets. James Sterbenz’s model views resilience as a two-
phase process. The inner phase is a never-ending cycle of network defense, 
detection, remediation, and recovery. The outside phase is aimed at process 
improvements: diagnosing the root causes of successful attacks and re!ning 
the tools and human behavior in use.
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ply tolerating the security degradation is a com-
mon strategy— assuming that the underlying system 
maintains su#cient functionality following a suc-
cessful attack. 
This strategy is widespread in homes and many 
small businesses, but we’ve seen it in large organiza-
tions as well. For example, in early 2011, we were 
handed a USB storage device while visiting an orga-
nization and were surprised to discover it contained 
a remote-control Trojan known to spread via USB 
devices. The device’s owner insisted that it was clean 
because it didn’t trigger his organization’s antivirus 
software. We uploaded the virus to VirusTotal, dis-
covered that the program was in fact malware, and 
provided the VirusTotal report to the organization’s 
security sta!. We never received a response. Months 
later, we learned that multiple machines inside the or-
ganization had persistent connections to cloud-based 
command-and-control nodes operated by a criminal 
enterprise. The organization, it seems, had fallen vic-
tim to the advanced persistent threat.
Strategy 2: Response and Recovery
In January 2001, VeriSign mistakenly issued two 
code-signing digital certi"cates to a person posing as 
a Microsoft employee. Microsoft eventually issued a 
security bulletin describing the situation and an op-
erating system patch that caused Windows to ignore 
the certi"cates.4
Although Microsoft could have executed an inter-
nal remediation strategy to determine the degraded 
security’s impact, we know of no e!ort at any Micro-
soft customer site to identify systems that might have 
been compromised by the certi"cates. Likewise, we 
know of no attempts to diagnose the root cause of the 
attack or re"ne tools and human response. 
The brittle public-key infrastructure (PKI) and 
certi"cate authority (CA)-based authentication and 
integrity systems used by all modern operating sys-
tems continue to be signi"cant points of vulnerabil-
ity. For example, two stolen certi"cates are credited 
with the spread of the Stuxnet worm. Today, the typi-
cal Internet- accessible computer contains more than a 
hundred CA certi"cates, many from organizations that 
might not be trustworthy. Both root and code-signing 
certi"cates have been compromised through a variety 
of means. Nevertheless, the current trust architecture 
is such that a single compromised CA or certi"cate can 
undermine an entire organization’s security.
Strategy 3: Isolate and Treat
An alternative to response and recovery is to iso-
late the a!ected components from the rest of the 
system, similar to medical quarantines of infectious 
diseases. Once the compromise is detected, the “in-
fected” components don’t come into contact with the 
“healthy” ones. 
Isolation works best when that capability is de-
signed into the system from the start. Operation in 
isolation requires that database systems, Web servers, 
and other services be removable without bringing 
down the rest of the enterprise. With appropriate de-
sign and con"guration, the compromise of one service 
need not necessarily compromise the entire system.
Isolation isn’t without signi"cant costs and risks. 
For example, during the 1988 Morris worm incident, 
several organizations disconnected from the Internet 
or manually shut down their vulnerable Unix-based 
computers. But those that followed this approach 
found that they were cut o! from the tools that quick-
ly became available to provide testing, analysis, and 
recovery from the worm. Similar problems happened 
in 2007 at the Naval War College, when a pervasive 
malware infestation forced the organization to dis-
connect its network from the Internet so that each of 
its Windows-based computers could be properly re-
mediated, signi"cantly hampering the ability of the 
facility and students to do anything else.
Isolation could be an e!ective strategy for organiza-
tions that need to evaluate an attack’s impact, but isolat-
ing a compromised system can also provide information 
to the attacker about detection and data that might need 
to be protected. In some cases, revealing this informa-
tion has additional costs and should be avoided.
Eventually, it’s time to move from isolation to re-
covery. Ideally, both can proceed at the same time, 
with the isolated system remaining operational (but 
removed) and new hardware being used for the re-
covery process. Failing this, the compromised system’s 
contents should be archived for analysis at a later point 
in time. The decision of when to move from isolation 
to recovery depends on the system, its design, and the 
environment in which it operates. 
Strategy 4: In Situ Analysis 
Organizations that detect compromised servers might 
choose to leave the server in place and initiate the co-
vert capture of network tra#c for later analysis; they 
can also monitor "le access patterns and take snap-
shots of the computer’s memory and hard drive with 
special-purpose hardware, software, or a virtual ma-
chine monitor. Ultimately, the organization needs to 
determine the scale of the unfolding incident—just 
like bedbugs, malware rarely infests a single host. 
In situ analysis should be performed according to a 
detailed malware infestation plan that (hopefully) was 
created in advance to deal with this situation. Critical 
tasks should be shifted elsewhere—not just from the 
infected machine but from the entire subnet or facil-
ity where the machine resides. Password-protected ac-
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counts accessed from the machine could be proactively 
locked, but log "les should be preserved and %agged for 
human analysis. The idea here is that identifying the 
attacker, the damage, and the means of compromise is 
vitally important but this identi"cation should be done 
without alerting the attacker, if possible. This is analo-
gous to counterintelligence e!orts to unmask a spy. 
Attackers might try to hide their activities and 
subvert monitoring and analysis attempts. For in situ 
analy sis to succeed, security professionals need to 
perform some careful advanced planning using well-
designed tools and techniques.
In situ analysis might be most appropriate for or-
ganizations that can’t reveal that they’re aware when 
they’ve been successfully attacked. For example, a 
utility that detects a successful attack against one au-
tomated power substation might want to keep this 
information secret if it has dozens of other substa-
tions with similar con"gurations and vulnerabilities. 
Likewise, organizations that suspect an insider attack 
might choose to quietly monitor their activity with 
the hope of catching that person in the act.
Strategy 5: Hunker Down and Live with It
Sometimes, organizations just have to accept and live 
with an attack’s damage. An analogous situation in 
the physical world is battleshort, in which war"ghters 
bypass safety features to complete a mission, even if 
doing so risks the destruction of equipment or the loss 
of life. In the computer security case, the organization 
will detect the attack or compromise but continue to 
operate the a!ected system anyway, without any at-
tempt at remediation. 
The battleshort approach is di!erent from in situ 
monitoring and isolation in that no one is necessarily 
doing an analysis or trying to "x the problem. This ap-
proach works best if an organization has plans and pro-
cedures in place to handle the situation—without them, 
battleshort e!ectively becomes “ignorance is bliss,” 
which can negatively impact the organization’s mission.
Consider a company that inadvertently distrib-
utes malware to all of its desktops. The IT depart-
ment could shift critical processes to other networks, 
require hosts to submit to network access scans or 
use some type of software attestation, wipe HTML 
and attachments from email, or force collaboration 
on smart-card-authenticated websites or SharePoint, 
all while leaving the malware in place. The company 
might choose this approach if it simply doesn’t have 
time to shut down the network and reimage every 
machine. Other options might include isolating the 
system to limit or prevent outside access. For exam-
ple, the company might increase a "rewall’s "ltering 
levels, switch to a di!erent communications media, 
or force a “key change” in the communications in-
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frastructure. These options work best if planned (and 
tested) in advance. 
The battleshort approach has signi"cant risks. If the 
attacker is an insider, then he or she might be able to 
in%uence the remediation actions. One way to coun-
teract this vulnerability is to enforce mandatory job 
rotation during a crisis situation so that more than one 
person is responsible for each job function. Another 
option is to ensure a strict separation of (security) du-
ties and enforce it even in times of crisis. 
Providing for Operations  
with Degraded Security 
We believe that modern cybersecurity theory and 
practice must expand to explicitly consider operations 
in a security-degraded environment. Users need bet-
ter procedures than simply disconnecting their virus-
infected computers from the network, backing up 
their data, wiping their disks, and performing a clean 
install of Windows—the virus remediation steps rec-
ommended by many popular websites.5 
Providing the ability to operate in a security- 
degraded environment might require both hardware 
and software support, such as "rmware that isn’t read-
ily reprogrammable or protected subsystems that can’t 
be updated. Developers created such strategies for the 
One Laptop per Child project;6 similar protection is 
in Google’s Chromebook, which is designed to detect 
problems, wipe itself, boot a protected partition, and 
restore the operating system and the user’s data from 
Google’s cloud. 
Out-of-band monitoring is another important tool 
for maintaining situational awareness in a security-
degraded environment. Cloud-based systems might 
provide for monitoring through the virtual machine 
supervisor; likewise, hardware could provide for 
monitoring via logs sent through “data diodes” to 
otherwise disconnected networks. 
D espite widespread agreement that security is a process and that perfect security is impossible 
to obtain, many individuals, organizations, and even 
governments today operate as if their computer net-
works were normally in a secure state. We treat our 
insiders (especially our system administrators) as if 
they’re forever trustworthy. We assume our software 
is bug-free. And when our systems inevitably become 
compromised, our immediate priority is to restore 
operations—not to diagnose what went wrong.
To return to the RAID analogy, the computing pro-
fession has been dramatically more successful in mod-
eling and discussing storage degradation than security 
degradation. This might be because RAID systems have 
relatively limited and clearly de"ned means of entering 
and leaving a degraded state; attackers have many op-
tions for creating a security-degraded environment. As 
such, organizations need to understand their alternatives 
and formulate a variety of possible responses. Current 
approaches assume attack detection is easy, ignore reme-
diation, and recommend immediate restoration. Such 
policies aren’t su#cient to address the complexity of to-
day’s threats. We must extend our security repertoire to 
support operation in a security-degraded environment 
if we are to learn to live with insecurity. 
Acknowledgments
Beth Rosenberg, James Sterbenz, Stephen Magill, and sev-
eral anonymous reviewers provided valuable comments on 
previous drafts of this article. The views expressed in this 
article are those of the authors and don’t re%ect the views of 
the Department of Defense or any of its agencies.
References
1. E.F. Moore and C.E. Shannon, “Reliable Circuits Us-
ing Less Reliable Relays,” J. Franklin Inst., vol. 262, no. 
3, 1956, pp. 191–208.
2. J.P.G. Sterbenz et al., “Resilience and Survivability in 
Communication Networks: Strategies, Principles, and 
Survey of Disciplines,” Computer Networks, vol. 54, no. 
8, 2010, pp. 1245–1265.
3. J.F. Meyer, “On Evaluating the Performability of De-
gradable Computing Systems,” IEEE Trans. Computers, 
vol. 29, no. 8, pp. 720–731.
4. Microsoft TechNet, “Erroneous VeriSign-Issued 
Digital Certi"cates Pose Spoo"ng Hazard,” 22 Mar. 
2001; www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/
MS01-017.mspx.
5. “My Computer Has Been Compromised, What Do I 
Do?” ClamWin Free Antivirus, 2001; www.clamwin.
com/content/view/146/27.
6. I. Kristic and S. Gar"nkel, “The One Laptop per Child 
Security Model,” Symp. Usable Security and Privacy, 
ACM Press, 2007; http://simson.net/clips/academic/ 
2007.SOUPS.Bitfrost.pdf.
Simson L. Gar!nkel is a professor at the Naval Postgraduate 
School, where his primary research area is computer forensics 
and information technology policy. He holds a PhD in com-
puter science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 
Contact him at http://simson.net/contact.
George Dinolt is a professor at the Naval Postgraduate 
School, where his primary interest is formal modeling and 
provably secure systems. He holds a PhD in mathematics 
from the University of Wisconsin, Madison. Contact him at 
 gwdinolt@nps.edu.
Selected CS articles and columns are also available for 
free at http://ComputingNow.computer.org.
